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USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY
LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
DECEMBER 16, 1977
San Francisco, California

0

CHAIRMAN MEL LEVINE:

_0

These hearings will now come to orde r .

My name is Mel Levine, and I•m the Chairman of the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee on the reform of the Penal Code.
0

To my far left is

Assemblyman Paul Bannai who is the Chairman of the Assembly Crimina
Justice Committee on Law Enforcement Specialized Training.
apologize to the people who have waited for this late start.

0

I want to
The

Chairman managed to miss his airplane in Los Angeles, but fortunately
there was another one nearby so we aren•t that late, but I•m sorry to
start a little bit late.
Let me introduce the people who are here at this table for

0

the benefit of any of you who do not know them.

On my left between

Assemblyman Bannai and myself is Patty Marchal who is Secretary to
0

the Criminal Justice Committee, and on my immediate right is Peter
Jensen, Consultant to the Criminal Justice Committee, and to my far
right is Michael Ullman, Senior Consultant to the Criminal Justice
Committee.
This is the second of two joint hearings of the sUbcommittees
on the Revision of the Penal Code and Law Enforcement Specialized Train-

0

ing dealing with the standards by which law enforcement personnel may
or may not use deadly force.

This is a thorny problem, and one which

has confronted civilized society for hundreds of years.
0

It requires

the balancing of the high regard for the sanctity of human life with
the need to enforee the laws of our communities in ordgr to

Re~~t

the citizens of this state to live without fear of abuse or a threat
from others.

without force situation, that is a serious felony, but no force was
used such as with a little girl.
We feel that the law currently has appropriate sanctions
should an officer misuse deadly force by negligence or state of fact
or by accident.

The department that he works for, or he himself

possibly, can be held civilly responsible.
instances that do occur, however.

There are not that many

Also, the officer that should he

through some other motive, whether it's a wanton, malicious act in
an appropriate manner, there are criminal sanctions that do exist
now, and certainly the District Attorney would prosecute and I know
of no situations where they would not.

The departments themselves

would actively go after the individual with investigation.
MR. MIKE ULLMAN:

Captain Smith, do you know of any recent

instances where the District Attorney has prosecuted police officers
with misuse of deadly force?
CAPTAIN SMITH:
no.

Mr. Ullman, I don't know of any currently,

There was one in another state recently, I believe the State of

Texas.
MR. ULLMAN:

There was a hearing in Los Angeles where it

was actually brought up to the opposite point that the prosecutors
don't prosecute and one of the reasons they don't prosecute is
because of the law as being written in this general fashion that it
would be very difficult to get a conviction.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

I just make that point.

Mr. Ullman, I would think that an officer

with premeditation used his firearm in a situation where he should
not have used it, in other words, it's a homicide.
-

That's what

-

we're talking about, murder, that the District Attorney would, in
fact, prosecute.

If he did not, certainly the public would go to
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the grand jury which is on the judiciary side and have a grand jury
investigation.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
at this point.

Excuse me, Captain, if I could interject

I'm wondering whether the circumstances that we're

concerned about are circumstances that really involve premeditation
or if we're really trying to get at something that's a tougher question.

I think that I agree with you that if we have a

premeditatio~

situation we have a likely prosecution situation, but one of the
things that concerns me in holding these hearings and has started
to concern me more after hearing the testimony in Los Angeles is the
gray area where there's clearly no premeditation, but where the
standards are such that the threshold at which the trigger can be
pulled is lower than a tougher standard might require.

If somebody

is in a position to know that law enforcement officers are in a
position to know when he is responding to a non-violent felon, that
the statue under which he's operating allows him the right to pull
the trigger, wouldn't he be more likely to pull the trigger than if
the statute that he is operating within didn't allow him that right
and required that he only respond with deadly force if he was dealing
with a

violent criminal?
CAPTAIN SMITH:

Yes, I would have to agree with you, but

then we get into a new area, Mr. Chairman.

The officer then would

allow the felon to escape if it was not a violent felony.

At the

time we may not know that it was, in fact, a violent felony, we
respond to a lot of calls.
The suspect is fleeing.
throughout the State of

They're not violent when we get there.

We do let them go.
Califo~nia

vary

~rom

we do let the individual fleeing get away.
that a more serious crime has occurred.
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Some of our policies
agency to agency, and
Then we find out later

This is a difficult area.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

I understand that, and you were referring

to that in your earlier testimony, and what I'm wondering is, and I
don't know the answer to this question, I'm wondering if there is
some middle ground that we can take between on the one hand the
statute that's been on the books since 1872, and perhaps on the other
hand the Kortum case or something like that where the officer at least
has to have some reason to believe, and I'm not sure that's the relevant standard, but if there is some way to get at the possibility
that a serious crime has been committed, something tougher than the
statutory standardbut perhaps a little clearer and more helpful to
the officer than the language in the Kortum case.

I don't know how

you'd arrive at that middle ground or whether you believe it's appropriate to try to do so, but that is something that concerns me, some
of the reasons that are underlying some of these questions that I'm
asking you.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

Yes, I would agree with you, Mr. Chairman.

It certainly is not appropriate to shoot at a forger, for example,
a woman who is fleeing and the officer couldn't catch her for some
reason.

Certainly that would be inappropriate.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

inappropriate,

And I think Kortum tells us that's

but the statute doesn't.

The statute says that an

officer can shoot at a forger.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

But in some cases you might want to.

This

is the problem.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

But in those cases, wouldn't you have

some reason to believe the forger had also done something more serious
as far as violence is concerned?

Couldn't you try to work the statu-

tory language into defining those situations rather than just leaving
it to the imagination of the officer?
-6-

CAPTAIN SMITH:

Well, that sounds fine, and maybe it would

be great if we could do it, but I think if we get a laundry list
appointing one not to shoot in this situation, and then do we follow
this little channel, yes or no, that type of thing, then we're going
to put the officer in a position of jeopardy because he's trying
to think of all of these things at the same time when his own life
may be threatened or that citizen.
I appreciate what you're saying, Mr. Chairman, to this
problem.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

And I appreciate what you're saying.

The other side of the coin, obviously, is where they were putting
citizens in a situation of jeopardy when the criteria that is currently
being applied allows for the use of deadly force in situations where
it perhaps ought not to be used.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

It comes back to the same issue in certain

cases it's left up to the judgment of the officer, and his good
judgment comes back to his training that he's had.
humanistic today.

Officers are

We do have psychiatric examinations for our

officers, potential candidates.

They are screened 6ut.

In many

departments, if officers begin acting strange, they are talked to,
and well, I can speak within my own department, if we do have a
problem, we have another way of handling it, getting the officer off
the street, being talked to, things of that nature.
do this.

Many departments

But I don't know of any officer today that personally would

not use good judgment.

It's a matter of trying to use that good

judgment at the right time.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

-

If I could leave that for a moment to

the point that Mr. Ullman interrupted your testimony, and that was
-7-

the issue of the D.A.'s prosecuting.

How would you feel about the

method, a piece of legislation which would create a special prosecutor for the prosecution of uses of deadly force by law enforcement
officers as opposed to having the D.A. be the prosecuting agency?
CAPTAIN SMITH:

And you're saying is a criminal prosecutor,

but it depends where the criminal sanctions would lie.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Regardless of the statute now.

Say, for

the point of argument, say the statute stays the same, and we don't
tighten up the standard at all, but we remove the prosecutorial
function from the District Attorney to a special prosecutor's office
which would be independent of the District Attorney's office, so that
at least the theory would have it that you don't have an agency that's
required to work so closely with law enforcement personnel on a dayto-day basis whose independence might be compromised in prosecuting
unlawful conduct regardless of what the statute was.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

Such as the Attorney General's office?

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Oh,

some~hing

further removed than that.

The Attorney General's office would obviously be further removed
than a local prosecuting agency but so an independent special prosecuting agency whose job was a variety of things including the prosecution of unlawful uses of deadly force by police officers.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

So long as they're qualified.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
CAPTAIN SMITH:

You wouldn't have any problem with that.
The FBI does that now also .

I just wanted

to make the point that if there are,criminal sanctions beyond what
exists now would be placed.

The officers are going to be very

concerned in each situation, and I would suspect that many of them
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0

are going to do as many citizens do today, turn their head, do nothing.

0

They just don't want to become involved.

With that you're going to

find like a response in a sense of pro-active law enforcement in this
state.

0

Would there be an increase in crime, probably a lot of people

that would have made good police officers would not want to come into
the business, if there are too strict sanctions.
before, if a doctor through mistake of fact,

As I've indicated

inadve~tance,

of that nature, puts an error in his practice, and

~he

something

same with an

attorney, they are handled in a civil area without any big problem.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

But the result normally from that type of

negligence is not the loss of human life.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

In the medical situation, it could be.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
statutes in the event.

Okay.

And there are criminal negligence

Okay, I think that's fair, but in the event

there is loss of human life, there is the

possibil~ty

of criminal

prosecution.
CAPTAIN SMITH:
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

That's correct, yes.

Certainly.

I have one additional question.

With
I

regard to your argument that if the standards become tougher

th~t

the

officer is likely to disengage, get less involved.

li~e

to

I'd just

explore that for a moment.
The Los Angeles Police Department recently has been guided
by new regulations that were imposed by the L.A. Police Commission
in response, as I understand it, to the Kortum case, and those regulations basically tapped the Kortum decision.

I don't know if you

had an opportunity yet to review them because they are new, and they
have only been in effect for a very short time, but I wonder whether
-9-

those regulations which really are meaningfully tougher than the 1872
statute are likely, in your opinion, to create the same result as
you•re talking about, the disengagement or uninvolvement of a police
officer.
CAPTAIN SMITH:

Well, I haven•t seen the Los Angeles standard

making reference to that to the officers becoming less involved, pertains
to what criminal sanctions might be placed on them.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
CAPTAIN SMITH:

But administration regulations are different.
Yes, they•re totally different.

The adminis-

trative regulations from that might be placed on the officer through
statute.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

How does an officer view it if there is a

way to generalize about administrative regulations vs. statutory
proscriptions?

Does an administrative regulation mean that much on

day-to-day conduct if the officer won•t be as likely to respond to an
administrative regulation as he will to a statute?
CAPTAIN SMITH:
know from my own

~ience,

No, he 1 ll respond.

Generally, as far as I

they respond to the administrative regulation;

if they do not, they can be suspended--that•s within my own department,
of course--be suspended or even terminated.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

But they wouldn 1 t be as likely to sort of

turn their back if the sanction weren•t a criminal sanction as they
would if the sanction were a criminal sanction, is that what you•re
saying?
CAPTAIN SMITH:
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Yes.
Mr. Jensen.
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MR. PETER JENSEN:

Captain, could you briefly summarize

for us the administrative regulations Oakland has for its officers?
They are different from the state &atute, aren't they?

They're more

restrictive?
CAPTAIN SMITH:
MR. JENSEN:

Could you summarize those?

CAPTAIN SMITH:
juveniles

Yes, they are.

Yes.

We do not use our firearms for

ell, the way it is now since the Kortum case?

Or prior

to the Kortum case?
MR. JENSEN:

Currently.

CAPTAIN SMITH:
Kortum.
vehicles

Currently we're right down the line with

It's ---------------------' and we will not shoot at moving
and juveniles, ever known to be a juvenile.

Again, unless

an officer's life or another person's life is threatened.
knew them to be violent at the time.

Unless we

Unless the juvenile is fleeing

and the suspect is fleeing the vehicle.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

I'd like to explore just one other area

with you.
As I understand the thrust of your testimony with regard
to your favoring the 1872 vs. a change, the principal concern is to
allow the law enforcement officer enough leeway so that if he hasn't
cooly committed a violent felony but still may be dangerous and has
committed a felony, and it turns out later that he, in fact, has
committed a violent felony and really is dangerous, you only give the
law enforcement officer adequate leeway to go after that person, is
that correct?
CAPTAIN SMITH:

That's correct.

we're seeking.
-11-

It's that latitude that

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

If a statute could be drafted which would

give you that latitude, but would require that the officer use deadly
force only in situations such as that, however they get defined, but
defined to give you that latitude and otherwise to shoot only a
violent felon as opposed to a felon without defining violent vs.
non-violent

what problem do you have with that type of change in t h e

law?
CAPTAIN SMITH:

That's not a great problem, as long as there

was not a longer list, which is of great concern to us.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Okay.

I'm not sure that it can be so

drafted, but I'm trying to get at the area that you have concern
with.

Thank you very, very much for your testimony.
Our next witness is Ed Roybal! from the Central Legal

de la Raza.
MR. EDWARD ROYBALL:
Assembly, I'm Edward Roybal!.

Ladies and gentelemen, members of the
I'm an attorney.

of a shooting victim in Oakland, California.
argue in favor for

I represent a family

And I'm here today to

this notion which would be strict control in the

use of firearms by police officers.
I think I just should point out that I did not receive the
packet from the committee, and so I did not have specific proposed
legislation to address, but I would like to speak about the issue of
police crimes, police looters, and the family I represent.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
simply suggest this?

May I interrupt you for one second and

If, after these hearings, you have the time

to develop specific proposed legislation based upon your views, we'd
very much appreciate

r~ceiving

that in writing, and would encourage

you to do that.
-12-

MR. ROYBALL:

The family I represent is but one example

in the family which is separated as the result of police lawlessness
and the unreasonable and unnecessary use of force by a police officer,
and in this case as in so many others, the act of this police officer
remains unchecked.
ofticer involved.

There was not so much as a reprimand against the
What I'm ta!king about is police crime, not a

shoot-out between police officers and armed criminals, but rather
situations in which police have killed unarmed civilians, persons who
were at most mere suspects.

I'm talking about a pattern of police

over-reaction, of police excessive use of force, harassment, intimidation, a pattern which it primarily affects minority and low-income
communities.

u.s.

Nothing has changed since 1968, when

Commission on

Civil Rights disclosed such a pattern as of finding the fact in its
Mexican-Americans in the administration of justice in the Southwest.
In fact, the statistics show that the incidence of police killings
not only of Chicanos, but also against Blacks, Whites, and all persons
in society had been on the rise in recent years.
1975, 75 unarmed suspects were shot by police.
18 Latin, and 10 were White.

In Los Angeles in
Of these 47 are Black,

In the first 6 months of this year in

1977, 28 more unarmed civilians were killed by police officers.

In

fact, in Los Angeles, 50% of all police shootings result in death,
and that is a figure which is much higher than the national average
which is somewhere below one-third.
In Oakland, where I now work, within seven months of 1975,
5 unarmed civilians were killed by police officers.
to your attention, too, the most blatant examples.

I'd like to bring
On August 19th,

Floyd Calhoun, age 23, who was a suspect in 23 deaths, fled from
police in his car.

His car wrecked, he ran to a street near
-13-

85th

in Oakland.

Police cars blocked off the street and at least 15

police were surrounding him when he was shot in the back, in the
head and the legs.

He was unarmed.

Earlier that year, February 3, Mr. Esther, age 34.

Mr.

Esther was mentally ill and his family had gone to the Oakland Police
Department for help.

When the police went to his horne, Mr. Esther

refused to allow him to enter.
policemen

He would not leave the house, and

attacked with tear gas.

The house caught fire.

Mr.

Esther lept out of the second story window, and he was killed by a
volley of four shots.

Also, in Emeryville, California in 1971,

there's a case of Tyrone Geiten, a 14 year old boy.
officers pursued him as a suspect in a car theft.
14 years old.

He ran down the street.

turned and fired.

Three police
He was unarmed,

Two of the three officers

He fell and these officers then went up to his

body and shot him again at point blank range, and he was unarmed.
MR. ULLMAN:

Are the police accounts of these shootings

as you are stating them, or are they somewhat other than this?
MR. ROYBALL:

Okay.

I do not know the official police

account in the Tyrone Geiten case, for example.

in litigation for about five years.

That case has been

There's been no action taken in

the case, but that suspect was 14 years old, unarmed, and was fleeing.
These facts are established.
MR. ULLMAN:

So what about in the Calhoun and Esther cases?

Are the police accounts the same as you have stated?
MR. ROYBALL:
accounts.

In all honesty, I do not know the police

This information I received from other persons through

their research, and I do not know the police accounts in those cases.
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In both of these cases, to my knowledge, the incident never became

0

an issue, and in fact in my capacity as an attorney I'm always learning
of incidents of police shootings, police brutality.
up on these.

0

I attempt to follow

In most instances, these instances die without so much

as a report in the newspaper or any action by the police department
or the persons involved.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Mr. Royball, how would a change in the

law affect these situations, and what change in the law in general,
even though you don't have specific legislation in mind, do you believe would be constructive, and what result would it accomplish?
MR. ROYBALL:

The problem is two-fold.

In addition to the

incidents of police accesses, and I guess the police motives are but
an extreme example of other acts of police brutality which go on
systematically, or at least are continuously occurring in the communities.

But there is also the problem of the unwillingness of the

local police departments to police themselves, and I feel that the need
for legislative control stems from this fact.

As I mentioned in these

five Oakland cases, there was no action against the officers involved.
In the Barney Benevitus case, Officer Michael Cagney violated
virtually every procedure established by the Oakland Police Department
for one man felony car stops and also to the discharge of firearms.
Step by step all the way down the line, Officer Cagney violated these
procedures.

Barney Benevitus was unarmed standing in a fixed position

when Officer Cagney took a loaded and cocked shotgun and attempted
to pat down, conduct a pat-down search and he shot him in the back
of the head, literally blew his brains and half his head off at
point blank range, and what followed then was not action by the
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police department based on Officer Cagney's violation of procedures
and the fact that a man was killed as a result, but rather a very
obvious and blatant attempt by the Oakland Police Department to cover
up the situation.

Most notably a few days, I believe it was three

days after Barney Benevitus was killed, the police department issued
a statement to the press that since a felony had occurred Officer
Cogney had merely followed routine procedures.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

What I don't understand from your testi-

mony is that if there is this type of local obstruction of justice
going on, what type of state legislation would be of assistance in
dealing with the problem?
MR. ROYBAL:

Okay.

Specifically, I would urge regulations

from the outside by the Legislature restricting the situations in
which officers can use firearms and realistically, I am not talking
about straight jacketed law enforcement or the legitimate concerns
of law enforcement but there are many situations in which case after
case show firearms have been used and I would, more than that, urge
that these legislative controls be, in fact, enforced and I think
that is more of the problem than anything.
Also, the facts show that local district attorneys have
not enforced statutes, criminal statutes, that stand now against
police officers in the decade of the '60s - between 1960 and 1970,
there were fifteen hundred killings of unarmed civilians.

Only three

resulted in any criminal sanctions against the officer involved.
The Barney Benevitus case is another example and other cases with
which I am familiar are examples of the fact that the district
attorneys most often will not prosecute a police officer regardless

-16-

0

of the fact, regardless of how blatant the incident was, including,
as in this case, the direct flagrant violation of procedures.

In

fact, following the Benevitus case, not only did the police department
issue statements that procedures had been followed, they also said
they found no grounds for disciplinary action whatsoever against the
officer.

It died right there in the police department.

The district

attorney in that case refused to prosecute the case himself.

What he

did was to convene the Alameda County Grand Jury to conduct two days
of closed hearings, the transcripts of which are unobtainable, and
the Grand Jury failed to indict.

We cannot -- we can only speculate

as to what happened inside, but I do know witnesses who testified,
and I do know that the district attorney spent more time inquiring
into the background of the victim than he did with the actual incident
itself.

Following the killing of Barney Benevitus, there have been

repeated acts of harassment

directed at the family.

In each case,

complaints have been filed with the internal affairs division of the
police department.

In every case, there has been no action taken.

The most blatant of these incidents involved half a dozen officers
appearing at the home of a man who was not an eyewitness but whom
Barney Benevitus had stopped to visit when he was pulled over or stopped
by Officer Cogney.
the morning.

Half a dozen officers appeared at 3:00 o'clock in

His brother opened the door, they ordered him out, they

had their weapons drawn, pointed at his head, they made mocking and
taunting remarks about Barney's death.

They threatened him when his

brother also appeared, they repeated their threats and only when their
mother appeared, who apparently they were not expecting to find, did
they leave, but not before giving the brother involved a ticket for

-17-

spitting on the sidewalk.
division.

This was reported to the internal affairs

Nothing happened.

Others, just to pick one or two of the

most blatant incidents, one of the sisters of Barney Benevitus was
stopped allegedly for a dog leash violation, well, it was a warrant
on a dog leash violation and she was stopped.

She was arrested.

She was searched by male officers who are not supposed to search a
woman.

She was detained for quite some time.

Then she was driven

to a parking lot where half a dozen patrol cars converged on the
scene.

She was searched again.

She was threatened.

She was put

back into the patrol car, driven to another parking lot where the
same thing happened again.

This went on for

2~

hours before she was

finally taken to the police department and booked.

Again, nothing

was done by the Internal Affairs Division by the Police Department.
They certainly do not patrol themselves.
This is why I feel there's a need for outside controls to
control the excesses and the abuses.

This is also the reason why

there is a need for an independent prosecution and for someone who
is responsible for and willing to vigorously prosecute these cases
where the police do act in a lawless fashion and do commit crimes
against people and do act with flagrant disregard for the rights of the
people that are supposedly protected.
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:
You're saying outside groups.

'
Mr. Roybal, evidently
you're an attorney.

Would you think that the grand jury,

and I am sure there are people that are chosen from this community,
respectful people, and they fail to indict based upon facts which they
collected which were not prejudiced by one side or the other, do you
.
think that that kind
a - decision that they reached was- not acceptable

of

to you?

Is that your opinion?
-18-

MR. ROYBAL:

My response to that would be indictment of

the grand jury system basically.
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:

You'd do away with all grand juries

then in the United States and say that there must be another system?
What other system do you think you could get any better?
MR. ROYBAL:

Okay.

In other words, the grand jury is an

antiquated mode of criminal prosecution which is almost never used
in over 99% of all cases.
his own investigations.

The District Attorney routinely conducts
Upon determining that he has sufficient

evidence, he files some information and it's followed by a preliminary
hearing at which the issue is whether there is sufficient evidence
to bind the defendant over for trial.
an open court.

The preliminary hearing is

It's an adversary proceeding.

Both sides are repre-

sented by council, and you do have an independent magistrate deciding
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind the defendant for trial.
In case of the grand jury, the proceeding is behind closed doors.
The

de~endant

does not even have a right to know that the grand jury

is being convened to consider charges against him.
presented by the District Attorney.

All testimony is

The defendant has absolutely

no input into it, nor does any outside interest have a right to be
present.
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:

Once you set up this other commission

or whatever you're thinking of, do you think that you would get more
input, or it would be better, or be unprejudiced or more likely to be
evenhanded?
body?

Do you think that is the reason why you think a separate

In other words, you have a suggestion.
MR. ROYBAL:

Okay.

or an independent office.

Who would you get?

I would suggest an independent prosecutor
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ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:
or just a group of people?
MR. ROYBAL:

Who would be independent?

One person,

Who would be independent?

Something on the state level.

obviously more than one person.

It would be

It would be an entire office, and

I would assume a team of prosecutors.
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:
MR. ROYBAL:
for this purpose.

Attorney General's office?

For example, or an independent body established

The issue of the problem which I am attempting to

address is the failure of both police officers, police departments,
and the local district attorneys to act in cases of police brutality.
In the

u.s.

Commission of Civil Rights, the Congress of the United

States, even the

u.s.

Attorney in Philadephia, Pennsylvania, have all

sighted but they call a blindness to police brutality, and that these
cases are not prosecuted, they are not acted upon.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

I would like, just for the record, to

indicate that these hearings, as I assume you know, don't deal with
the scope of the matters that you're testifying about.

We're talking

now, at least in this context, only about the issue of the use of
deadly force by police officers, and we're trying to get a focus on
whether or not there ought to be different legislation or any legislation with regard to the use of deadly force.

These other issues

that go beyond deadly force are not really going to be dealt with
by any of the legislation that will come out of these hearings, so
to the extent you could confine your testimony to the issue before us,
it would be helpful.
MR. ROYBAL:

Could I ask you, not only the discharge of

firearms, but also the use of firearms and in which situations it
-20-

0

is permissible for an officer to use and draw weapons.

By the use

of the firearms, I find it would be clearly included within the issue
of use of deadly force.
MR. ULLMAN:

I hate to go back on what you're just talking

about after Mr. Levine was taking you away from it, but you're talking
about police officers violating civil rights of other persons, and you
seem to be fairly well convinced that the evidence against us is
well documented.

fa ~ ~ly

Has the FBI been brought into it?

MR. ROYBAL:
case began in June.

Yes.

The FBI investigation in the Benevitus

Just last week I was in Washington, and that was

the Justice Department, and was told the investigation will be expedited and completed in the corning weeks.
MR. ULLMAN:

D

Well, do you feel that the FBI is providing

protection that you're asking that some independent body, such as a
special prosecutor or a state attorney general or whatever have you,
because you're talking about flagrant cases, I believe, or violations
of civil rights, and we're not talking about judgmental calls which
is basically what this hearing is about. Do you feel that the FBI is
providing the kind of protection that you're talking about?
MR. ROYBAL:

Well, in answer to your question, no, and in

fact one of the first comments that Mr. G. Days made, head of the
civil rights division in Washington, is that the FBI cannot go around
policing incidents of police brutality every time the local authorities
fail to take action to prosecute.

And of course that is true.

The

answer to that would be to point out the very flagrant nature of the
civil rights violation in this particular case, but it is true that the
federal government cannot assume the role of policing the police.
-21-

That's why I'm calling for a body on the local level which will
assume that function, given the unwillingness of the police to
patrol themselves.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. ROYBAL:

Do you have further testimony?

That is basically all.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Do you have a police commission in

Oakland?
MR. ROYBAL:

There is no police commission.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Is there a local body in Oakland that

does have jurisdiction, the so-called policing the police?
MR. ROYBAL:

There is none.

The only body is the internal

affairs division of the police department.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Thank you very much for your time and

your testimony.
Our next scheduled witness is Jermiah P. Taylor, Deputy
Chief of Operations of the San Francisco Police Department.

Chief

Taylor.
MR. JEREMIAH P. TAYLOR:

Welcome.

I'm unfamiliar with

the format of your hearing.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Okay.

Fine.

What we are trying to get

at, Chief Taylor, is basically whether or not the 1872 Statute which
is on the books with regard to the use of deadly force by police
officers, Penal Code Section 196, should be changed.
We are looking at it in light of the Peterson and Kortum
cases which addressed that issue directly in the courts in the past
year, and we're interested in your thoughts on that sUbject.

In

particular, on anything related to it that you'd like to offer.
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MR. TAYLOR:
0

Well, I refreshed my memory on that particular

section last night when I knew I was corning down here, and I see
no need in San Francisco for any revision or change of it.

We have

a strict and close control of all of our operations in regard to the
use of deadly force, and in fact, in the use of any force by any San
Francisco policeman.

I've been over the statistical material that

bears on the subject, tnat is the amount of people in San Francisco,
the cases that we're involved in with regard to arrest, and I'm talking
about serious felony cases where violence or force could be used, or
homicides, robberies, and/or aggravated assaults, and I find that in
all those cases, and we made about 3,000 arrests this year, we've had
to use force in

le~s

than 1% of the cases.

This gets down to actually

37 instances when our policemen were involved in the use of violence
or deadly force, a pistol, and we find that our investigation of the
incidents by the patrol force, myself, that is the hierarchy of command by our internal affairs bureau, that lays on an additional
examination, by the inspector's bureau, that is our detectives that
work in conjunction with and closely alongside of the district
attorney's office, that we have no difficulty that way.
So, as I say, we find we're under close control, and have
no difficulty.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
instances

Can I ask you a question about those

Have there been any deaths in those 37 instances in

1977?
MR. TAYLOR:

Yes.

Of the 13 cases in which somebody was

actually hit with gun fire, two suspects were killed, one

po~i~e

officer was killed, twoofficers were injured, and eight suspects
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were injured, making a total number of thirteen cases in which there
was actually a result or rather injuries as a result of police
action.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Do you know whether those statistics are

generally the same from year to year or whether there are any significant changes from year to year?
MR. TAYLOR:

I think they were reduced about three years

ago, and now they are consistently quite low.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Do you have any ideas as to why they were

reduced?
MR. TAYLOR:

Yes.

A concentration of effort on the part

of the department with the implementation of a new gun control policy
was no doUbt almost completely responsible for it.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

So that about three years ago, there was

a new gun control policy in the SFPD?
MR. TAYLOR:
give me a moment.

Yes.

I have the date here exactly, if you'll

It was in January of 1972 that we implemented our

new policy and procedures with regard to the use of firearms throughout
the department, and it was at that time we started teaching it basically to the recruits.

We passed out information generally, and

there was a complete education in the department in regard to their
ability to use firearms and the restrictions thereon.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

How does that policy compare with Section

196?

MR. TAYLOR:

Actually, this lies on the restrictive side

of that particular section.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
tive in San Francisco?

In other words, we're more restrictive.
Can you summarize how you're more restric-24-

MR. TAYLOR:

Well, I think that the requirements that can

only be used in defense of himself when he has reasonable cause to
believe that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury, is a little bit more restrictive, and this also applies to
using it or utilizing the deadly force when some other person is in
danger of death or of serious bodily injury, and the interpretation
of the particular cases.

And what we've done is we've gone through

the criminal code and picked up those areas where our policemen

are

most apt to be involved with violence, and we specified specifically
what it is that they can and can't do.
For instance, under the section on burglarly, we tell them
that they can't use force in the arrest of a burglar.

"An ordinary

burglary does not involve the use of force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury.

Therefore, an

officer would not be per-

mitted to discharge his weapon in attempting to apprehend a burglar
unless he possesses information time he is required to act, that the
burglar used force likely to produce death or great bodily injury or
threatened to use such deadly force or perpetrate such great bodily
injury.

He should keep in mind that the right of self-defense

always exists."

As I say, we have these particular sections broken

down with the specifics of what they can and can't do, and I feel
that this is more restrictive.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Is it your understanding that that policy

has, to all intent and purposes, been complied with since it's been
enacted?
MR. TAYLOR:

Yes.
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CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Has an argument been made internally to

the effect that it has?
MR. TAYLOR:

There are arguments to that effect that this

is inhibiting, and that officers, instead of corning up to the mine
of legality back away in order to have a cushion, a safety, and this
is probably true.

However, I don't think it acts adversely on our

operation to the extent that it needs changing.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Would there be any difficulty, in your

opinion, in applying that type of a standard statewide?
MR. TAYLOR:

I can hardly see anything but think that it

ought to be done if we're doing it here, and it's working, and it
is, and I can testify to that.
being done statewide.

I would recommend that it be done statewide.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. TAYLOR:

I can't see anything wrong with it

In the form of a statute?

You're getting into areas of technical questions

that I don't think I am capable of answering.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

The solution in the form of policy, you

would recommend this as a statewide policy.
MR. TAYLOR:

I think that we have the finest policy that

I am aware of, and as a consequence, for the safety of all why it
would not be appropriate.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

And you have had good success with that

policy?
MR. TAYLOR:

We have had very good success.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Thank you.

Do you have any other tes-

timony or remarks that you care to give the committee?
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MR. TAYLOR:

0

I can only say, as I say, summing up what I

have made comments about, and that is that our officers act without
precipitation.

They go forth deliberately.

I've quoted the fact

that we've been involved with 3,000 arrests here in San Francisco,
and as a result of our training and of the policies that we have
in effect, that there has been a miniscule amount of violence used,
and I attribute this to the high quality of the policemen in San
Francisco and to their training.
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:

Are you under any kind of police

commission in San Francisco today?

How much influence do they

have upon the rules such as you draw up there?

Do they get involved

in that, or is that something within the department?
MR. TAYLOR:

0

Everyone of the rules must be submitted to

them, and they must pass it.

They are the ones who actually imple-

ment or promulgate all rules in the police department and they, as
I say, did on both this policy and on the rules and procedures, and

0

I make that point that the policy is additional material bearing
on what amounts to the rules or laws of our operation so that it
widens it and enlarges it and gives them information.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
internal doings?

Do they ever get involved in any of your

Let's assume that in this 37 use of deadly force,

that there might have been a question relative to whether or not
the police act in a right manner?
involved in that?

Would the police commission be

Are they given any right to look into it?

MR. TAYLOR:

Any allegation of impropriety or failure

or lack of, however you want to call it, any fault on the part of
the police department ends up in the form of an investigation which
the chief passes th rough an d the Comml.'ssl.'on gets a copy of the entire
-27-

and complete investigation, and it's on the basis of their determination that the final--they're kind of like the top echelon.
MR. ULLMAN:

Chief, prior to 1972 when these rules were

talked about, was there a widespread prediction within the police
department that these new rules would not work, or would lead to
not making arrests, predictions that it would just fail in general?
MR. TAYLOR:

There were comments to that effect.

I don't

want to say that they were--there were enough of them around.

As

I say, any change brings problems, comments, and unhappiness, but
it went down smoothly and swiftly enough.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

And you think now generally that the police

officers are satisfied with these rules on their conduct?
MR. TAYLOR:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Chief, could I ask you if you could sUbmit

a copy of those rules to this committee at some point?
MR. TAYLOR:

I will request of the Chief of the Department

that you were rather well informed and have made this request, and
I'm sure he'll send you one.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Thank you for your time and your helpful

testimony.
Is Mr. Walter Barkdull here?

Mr. Barkdull from the

California Department of Corrections, our next witness.
MR. WALTER BARKDULL:
of the committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members

Walter Barkdull, Department of Corrections, the

State Department of Corrections.
What I'd like to do this morning is take a moment of your
time to describe briefly the role of the Department of Corrections
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and how that differs from the general law enforcement operations
about which you've already heard substantial testimony, also some of
the problems created by the Peterson decision as we understand it
and some specific solutions we think could be reached in that matter,
plus perhaps a few miscellaneous comments on some of the prior testimony.
One of the big differences, of course, is that with a very
minor exception we are not in the corrections end of it dealing with
any question of innocence, and I would like to speak at some greater
length about that, but a little later on.

But on the other hand,

they're not necessarily all felons either, so there is a problem
in that respect.

We have, as a department, basically two missions.

One is the supervision of persons in the field, the parole operations and the other, of course, is the institutional phase of the
correctional experience.

I'll dwell only a moment on the parole

end of it simply to say that there are 18,000 persons currently under
supervision in California by approximately 500 officers of the
department, all of whom are peace officers.

They make several

thousand arrests in the course of a year, but with some very small
exceptions, the parole agents of the department are not permitted
to be armed.

We permit them to be armed only when they are the

subject of a direct personal immediate threat, and as a consequence
out of these more than 500 agents currently only three are armed
and that, of course, is purely for purposes of self-defense.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. BARKDULL:

Are they trained in the use of firearms?

In the instances where they are committed

to be armed, we insist that they have the POST approved firearms
-29-

training.

We do not provide that training to the bulk of agents

because, obviously, it would be unnecessary.
Now, the institutional

~hase,

into the major problems in this area.
currently imprisoned in the state
are convicted felons.

I think, is where we run
We've got about 19,500 persons

~ti~utions.

About 18,000 of those

The difference represents approximately 1500

or so persons who are civilly committed as narcotic addicts, and a
group generally runs around 500 miscellaneous category, probably
the largest number of which are persons who have been convicted of
an offense for which they could be sent to prison, and the court
has elected to send them to us for a diagnostic study, 1203 P.C.
study,

z

cases as they are called in the system.

But they have them

convicted but not sentenced, and I suppose some could be disposed
of by the courts as misderneanants when that time arrives.
In connection with the civil rights, it should be understood also that 95% of those have been convicted of a felony in
Superior Court, but the judgment has been stayed while the civil
commitment has been exercised.

There are, however, one or two

straight-forward volunteers and there is a small percentage who are
convicted only of misdemeanors.

The Penal Code, however, says that

that institution has to be treated in the same way as the state prison.
The characteristics of the male felons who are committed to prison,
I think, are also illuminating.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Excuse me.

I don't know if your're about

to get into this, but can you divide within the general felony categories

vio~t

and non-violent felonious convictions?
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MR. BARKDULL:

I can do it statistically, but I can't do

it operationally.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. BARKQULL:
you the details.

Approximately statistically.

Well, statistically, in fact I will give

Statistically of the male felons, 58.9% of those

in prison at the end of this last June were there on what I would
describe as a crime of violence.
rape.

Homicide, robbery assault, or

The percentage is slightly smaller for the female felon

offender, 41.1%.
We get less than 15% of those persons who are convicted
in superior courts and could be sentenced to prison.

Now, the other

85% roughly are dealt with by diversion into probation, or probation
in jail, or into the narcotic effort and smaller amounts into the
Youth Authority and the Department of Health.
15% or less of those convicted.

So we're only getting

And this, of course, is an adverse

kind of screening process that results in the high proportion of
those that we receive being in for homicide over the system as a
whole.

Of the men, almost 18% are in on a conviction of homicide,

somewhat over 18% of the women in the system are there on a conviction of homicide.

Robbery runs in the men around 28%, 16% females,

assault is about 7.9 and 5.6.
and .2 among the females.

Rape around 5.2 among the males,

We do have one woman currently convicted

of rape in the system.
On other thing besides these formal commitment offenses,
we have looked into the background of others received, and due to a
variety of circumstances with which you're familiar in the criminal
justice system, many of the others are actually--the conduct was a
-31-

violent offense which for one reason or another has typically been a
violent offense reduced to a burglarly instead of being prosecuted
as a rape or robbery or something of that kind.

And others do have

violence in their background, so we•re dealing with a volatile and
dangerous population, but they•re not all convicted felons.
Now, how do we control the people who are sent to us?

The

biggest method, the most significant method, I think, is a classification of the inmates.
security camps.

We have 12 institutions, 15 or 18 minimum

They range from the maximum institution at Folsom

where there are walls and armed perimeter inside cells, interior
gun rails, et cetera, to the camps which really have no perimeter.
There•s a couple of signs out there that say this is off-limits or
out of bounds, and that•s about the extent of it.

And then we have

more than 3,000 of these 18,000 felons in minimum security at this
time.

Obviously, this concentrates the more dangerous individual

in the more secure institutions and conversely
of less serious

crime~generally

place~

those convicted

speaking, in the less secure insti-

tutions where we do not have an armed perimeter and we don•t get
into the problems the committee is concerned with.

But at DVI,

the Deuel Vocational Institution, The California Medical Facility,
the California Mens• Colony, the central facility at Soledad,
Folsom, and San Quentin, every fourth or fifth person that you
encounter in the yard there has been officially convicted of a
homicide ranging 20-25% of them.
The other big method of control is personal interraction
between the staff and the inmate body.
unarmed assignments.

85% of our officers serve in

I 1 m speaking strictly of the peace officer
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personnel at this point, the correctional officers and their superiors, and none of those who are down in contact with prisoners, of
course, are ever armed except under some extreme emergency, and
even then we try to avoid that.

So it's a lot of control by personal

interraction.
We do have over the three shifts that it takes, of course,
to operate an institution, about 13% of the uniformed staff in armed
posts.

That amounts to about 550 employees, and we do have for their

guidance a written policy as to the use of firearms.
vative policy.

It's a conser-

If I may, I'll just read it here because it's brief.

This is from the Department of Corrections• . rules of the Director.
"The greatest caution and conservative judgment must be
exercised when using firearms.

No employee will be assigned to

carry or use a firearm who has not received departmentally approved
firearms training.

Institution firearms are only to be used when

absolutely necessary to prevent escapes, assaults, or disorders.
Before aiming a shot at any inmate, a warning must be given by
shouting, blowing a whistle or firing a warning shot into the air
or in a safe direction in keeping with the surroundings.

When it

is necessary to direct shots at an inmate, they will be aimed to
disable rather than kill."

Each institution must maintain a per-

manent chronological record, et cetera.
You will note that this policy does differ to some extent,
I think necessarily so, from that policy that has been presented
this mroning, and as I understand, at your Los Angeles hearing.
One of the differences, of course, relates to the restriction to
violent felonies, and again as I progress through here I want to
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comment on that a little more, but the simple fact as you elicited
by questioning earlier, once they're in the system, and in certain
places there may be high probabilities, but there is no way that
the officer on the wall or in the tower can tell what the basis of
the conviction was.
The other difference is in the use of warning shots which
we employ frequently.

I can understand that the institutional thing

is a great deal different than what you would be doing on a busy
street, but we use them very frequently.

We use, even as a matter

of fact, blanks, quite frequently, as a warning shot, or frequently
that's all it takes.

We do have another difference, I think, that the

police officer does not generally have, and that's the capability to
the circumstance, and we lean heavily in the direction of the less
lethal weapon.

We do use tear gas on occasion.

as I've mentioned.

We use blanks

We use something called, I guess, it's trade-

marked, but it's a stun gun--it shoots a thing like a bean bag out
and while it may incapacitate the person, it doesn't break the skin
or that sort of thing.

We've used weapons that fire wooden pellets,

and on some occasions some kind of plastic.
less lethal than the normal kind of weaponry.

Again, these are far
And we do, by policy,

have a specific set of weapons that are employed throughout the
department.

We have shotguns, but bird shot is probably the most

frequently loaded in connection with that.
MR. ULLMAN:

Is there an average range at which you

generally have to shoot?
MR. BARKDULL:

Taking it as an average, yes.

It's probably

somewhere around 150 yeards, somewhere in that vicinity.
-34-

But this

0

varies tremendously.
0

I guess what I'm really saying is the maximum

distance is perhaps 200 from any particular armed post.

We do

issue a rifle, which is a small caliber rifle with a fairly small
projectile, and the training for these requires a semi-annual qualification on a POST approved course including explanations of the
policy, and when to use the weapon, that sort of thing, safety with
the weapons, and the actual firing of them.

We use the weapons,

of course, to prevent escapes or to capture people who have escaped
to prevent or halt assaults, and to prevent or halt riots.

Inci-

dentally, in the rare occasions when this may result in a fatality
under existing statutes, this is automatically a coroner's case or
there is an outside independent investigation of any fatality that's
involved.
Now, as we understand the court decision •••
MR. ULLMAN:

What is the status of the current law on using

deadly force to disburse a riot within a prison?

Is that covered

under 196?
MR. BARKDULL:

We believe that it is, yes, and I think

that's something that we have to watch carefully in the process,
how you define a riot, et cetera.
MR. ULLMAN:

Riot traditionally is a misdemeanor.

Is

there a special felony statute that covers riot within a prison,
or is that dispute an attempt to escape?
MR. BARKDULL:
Mike.

I can't give you a direct answer on it,

It's regarded, I think, as a prelude to an assault.
MR. ULLMAN:

And this underscores my second question.

Do

you feel that the prison situation should not be covered by the same
1872 statute that covers the line officer on the street?
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MR. BARKDULL:

No.

We have no problem with the existing

statute.
MR. ULLMAN:

Even though you're demonstrating that the needs

within prisons are quite different.
MR. BARKDULL:

Yes.

I think we have no problem with the

statute as it stands currently, or with the Government Code as it
relates to liability.
MR. ULLMAN:

You would have problems if someone interpreted

a riot within the prison as being non-felonious conduct.
MR. BARKDULL:

Yes, we would.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

I assume you also do have a problem with

Kortum and Peterson as it applies to prisons.
MR. BARKDULL:

Yes, we do sir.

And as we understand it,

the decision overreaches the argument that Mr. Finch proposed both
to the court and to the committee in that the decision at least
seems to change not only the tort liability that I got that he was
seeking to have changed, but also defense against criminal charges,
and we would suggest that this

causes not only the problem that

Mr. Ullman raised, but whether the language of Peterson speaks to
an atrocious, violent felony, and from past decisions in relation
to the felony murder rule, et cetera, we doUbt that escape could
be considered an atrocious, violent felony unless it were accompanied
by some other action other than the escape itself, and the problem of
assaults is a very real one.

It's really impossible down in a prison

yard, a fight breaks out, people are milling around.

You can't tell

whether the combatants are armed until somebody is gravely wounded,
and it's been our policy to try to break up something of that sort.
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Now obviously we don't want, because of this decision, to
subject the employees to some kind of criminal homicide charges,
and we certainly don't want to place them in a position where some
punitive personal liability might ensue.

On the other hand, we

feel a duty to protect the inmates and the staff because that's
how you can have those unarmed persons down there backed by others
who are; so what we would suggest, as our solution to the problem,
would be for the Legislature to, by resolution I think would be
appropriate, to reaffirm that the Legislature meant what it said
when it said that deadly force could be used in connection with
any felony.
Now I recognize from the testimony this morning that that
may cause you a problem in connection with things on the street,
and I guess we'd have to suggest alternatively there should be some
special provisions, some special defenses in relation to the prison
situation.

Otherwise you have anomalousness, and I would think

ridiculous the situation of people escaping with impunity or not
only with impunity, if they got hurt in the process, being compensated by the state, perhaps.
Basically, we feel that if the Peterson circumstances were
allowed to stand so far as they applied to the prison situation,
that it will badly cloud our ability to respond to immediate life
and death kinds of situations, and that kind of immediate response
is vital to the safety of the inmates and the staff, and to the public
as well.
0

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

In light of who you're representing, your

concern I take it is primarily, if not exclusively tn this testimony,
with regard to prison situation.
D
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MR. BARKDULL:

Yes sir, that's correct .

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

So that if we were to draft legislation

which provided a special defense for prison situation or exempted
a prison situation, and made clear that in those circumstances the
1872 law applied, you'd be okay as far as your specific concerns?
MR. BARKDULL:

Yes, I believe that we would.

Other than the

possibility that Mr. Ullman raised.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Right.

Do you have statistics at your

disposal with regard to the number of shootings or deaths that have
taken place in the California prison system of a relevant time
period?
MR. BARKDULL:

Yes, I have them here with me.

We went over

it for an 18 year period, and there were 12 fatalities.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. BARKDULL:

During the 18 years?

Yes, and of those 12, five occurred in the

attempt to escape, five occurred in the midst of a direct assault
by the victim, and two were in the nature of disturbances.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. BARKDULL:

What about the other six?

No, that should add up to 12.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

I'm sorry, that's right, 12.

What were

the 18 years?
MR. BARKDULL:

Up to the present.

that statistics were started.

I think it was 1963

Actually it measures from 1960.

I'm

sorry, the first fatality in that period was in 1963.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Has there been any period in which there

were a number of fatalities, or have they been spread out over the
time period?
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MR. BARKDULL:

Generally speaking, they were spread out

over the time period with the exception of an extremely unfortunate
incident in 1970 in which three persons were killed in one operation,
so to speak.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. BARKDULL:

Was that an escape attempt?

No, that was an assault by one group of

prisoners on another group of prisoners in the adjustment center
exercise yard at Soledad.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

And these 12 fatalities are statewide for

this entire period here?
MR. BARKDULL:

Yes.

Incidentally, in the period during

which those occurred, more than 105,000 persons were committed to
prison.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Have your rules changed at all with

regard to the use of force during thos 18 years?
MR. BARKDULL:

I don't believe that they have changed to

any appreciable sUbstantive degree.

They have changed because we

had to go under the Administrative Procedures Act and things of that
sort in that intervening period so there have been different numbers
on them, and probably somewhat different wordings.
~

MR. ULLMAN:

Are there any changes in director's rules, or

institutional rules based on the class of custody at the institutions?
For instance, at a minimum security camp, are they the same rules for
use of force to prevent escapes as there are at Folsom?
MR. BARKDULL:

D

I believe, Mr. Ullman, that the rules are the

same, but the practical circumstances are vastly different.

At San

Quentin or Folsom you have an armed perimeter, you have gunmen on
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the rails there and inside, et cetera.

At the minimum security

facilities you have no such armed perimeter.

The camp, for example,

if there is something to escape to, the lieutenant has to go some
distance, usually to his horne, and there he has a .38 revolver that
he can provide himself.
MR. ULLMAN:

Is it the policy of the department to use

deadly force to prevent escape at minimum security institutions?
MR. BARKDULL:
MR. ULLMAN:

No, it would not be.
I have another question.

Do you have advice

of the Counsel or advice of the Attorney General as to Kortum and
Petersen affecting your department?
MR. BARKDULL:

We have discussed it with our own counsels.

To the best of my knowledge we have had no advice from the Attorney
General in that respect.
MR. ULLMAN:

And do you have any conclusions as to whether

or not the department is going to regard it as applying to them?
MR. BARKDULL:

We do not now regard them as applicable in

its current status.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Thank you very, very much.

Our next witness will be Harold Snow, the Executive Director
of the Peace Officers Standards and Training Post.
Is Steve La Plante here, San Francisco Sheriff's office?
MR. STEVE LA PLANTE:
for the City and County.

I'm what is called the jail ombudsman

It's a German word and means mediator, and

I handle grievances and resolve disputes in the jails and in the
Sherif~·-~ Depar~rnent.

I am a criminologist by background, and I am

a civilian, not a peace officer.
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I'm also the team leader of the

of the Sheriff's Department Crisis Negotiating Unit which will
become relevant in a minute.
What I want to address my comments to is specifically to
situations wherein a suspect is contained, where you have a situation
of an armed suspect who may or may not have assaulted somebody but
who is not fleeing, who is contained and surrounded by peace officers.
That's what I'd like to talk about.

As you probably knew, in the

Fall of '72, the New York City Police Department developed a hostage
negotiator unit, and it was January 20th of '73 that it was used
for the first time in which trained negotiators dealt with the hostage situation in Brooklyn.
hostages were killed.
country.

It was successfully concluded and no

Since that time, it spread throughout the

As a matter of fact, the San Francisco Police Department

started it in 1974.

What we have in the Sheriff's Department is based

on the concept of negotiating, where hostages are taken, and to develop
a situation where whenever there's a major crisis in our department,
whether it be in the jails or on the streets, in a sense of an
addition, for example, that it be our policy to negotiate first and
only to assault when that would have failed.
Now what I'd like to explain is that what

happens now with

hostage teams is that they are also used whenever the situation of
a barricaded suspect, where there may not be a hostage, but just a
suspect in a room who has a weapon and locked in.

What we feel and

what the administration of the San Francisco Sheriff's Office feels,
is that it should be the policy of every agency in California, peace
officer agency, to take the postion if there's a contained situation
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to negotiate first, to attempt to negotiate, and only if that fails,
to assault.

You see a lot of agencies take the position that the

SWAT special weapons tactics teams are called out, they set up a
perimeter, they get out the bull horn, they say you got five minutes,
and you don't come out, they throw in tear gas, and wait for it to
settle and then they storm.

Well, we think that's a very antiquated

notion of doing police work.

We feel that it should be the position

of every agency that at least an attempt is made to negotiate first
with the suspect.

Oftentimes the suspects are engaging in an elabor-

ate form of suicide, and they cannot kill themselves, and they want
somebody like the police to kill them for them.

Sometimes they are

simply caught in the act of a crime, or they are caught in the act
of being out in the streets with a weapon, and quite often they are
mentally disturbed.

I'm not sure how you would translate that to

legislation, but what we would like to propose is that you seriously
consider if that's possible to the extent that it would apply to all
the law enforcement agencies in California.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

That we seriously consider requiring

negotiation first, is that what you're saying?
MR. LA PLANTE:

Right.

Now let me explain that it's

possible to draw that up in such a manner, and we'd be happy to give
you a few documents that I didn•t bring, to really clarify what
situations would entail negotiating, and which ones wouldn't.
Generally speaking, what we feel is this.

If once an

attempt were to be made to talk to the suspects with a hostage
taker and after that attempt was made the person was to
do any
- - -harm or to hurt anybody, we would suggest that negotiations cease
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and you assault.

However, in a situation where, let's say the

homicide or the serious assaults inflicted, in the heat of the
beginning of the situation where anxiety levels are high, that
you retreat and wait a few minutes and try to negotiate after you
have set up a perimeter.
teams.

We do not advocate the abolition of SWAT

We do not advocate a statewide unit or regional units.

think it should stay within the local purvue.

We

We feel there should

be specially trained teams but we feel that SWAT teams should work
in conjunction with negotiator teams.

As a matter of fact, the

latest thing we are doing in the sheriff's and police department
is undergoing joint SWAT negotiator training sessions where we'll
set up a situation and then negotiate it and try to resolve it.
CHAIRMAN

LEVINE:

MR. ULLMAN:

Mr. Ullman.

Why do you think this has not been widespread

in California, after the New York experiment and, apparently it
received a lot of pUblicity with the police agencies, why is there
hostility towards this in the police departments, if there is any?
MR. LA PLANTE:

Basically, particularly in the last year

and a half, the main form of hostility has really dissipated.

It

was the kind of a change that just took a few years to take effect.
Where you have hostages, I don't think there are very many agencies
left in California that wouldn't try to talk first.

What I am

talking about specifically is where you don't have a hostage, where
you can contain a suspect, most agencies will get out their sharpshooter teams in position, go green light, which means that when
they have a chance to shoot, they will, and that will take care of
it.

We are saying that even in those situations there should be a

policy of trying to negotiate first.
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MR. ULLMAN:

And you believe that policy should be

statewide?
MR. LA PLANTE:
MR. ULLMAN:

Yes, definitely.

Who are you representing?

MR. LA PLANTE:

I am representing the department here,

the acting sheriff, Jim Denman, has authorized me to say this.
It would have been the same thing.

The previous sheriff would

have said it if he'd been here.
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

May I ask a question?

Yes, Mr. Bannai.

ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:

You indicated that you are a jail

ombudsman, is that what it is?
MR. LA PLANTE:

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:

If somebody is in jail and feels

that there is undue force in retaining him or, shall we say
brutality, do you listen to his case, is that your responsibility?
Do you have many of those in San Francisco?
MR. LA PLANTE:

Actually, quite frankly, since the time

that Sheriff Hongisto first took in, we have had a tremendous
decrease in those things.
on one hand.

In the last year, you can count them

I handle some very traditional working-condition,

living-condition type grievances.

I am also on call and respond

whenever there is a crisis, such as a potential disturbance or
an actual disturbance in the jail.
CHAIRMAN BANNAI:

I meant to ask the chief when he was

here, but maybe you can answer it.

In Los Angeles, you know we

have lines of debarkation and jurisdiction of the sheriff and
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the city police because we have city and county lines.

Since you

are a county and a city of San Francisco, what jurisdiction do you
have as far as the sheriff's department and the police department?
Does one write tickets on the street and the other one somewhere
else?
MR. LA PLANTE:

The San Francisco Sheriff's office handles

all of the jail duties for the city and county jails, including the
booking facility.

About 85% of our duties concern the jails.

We

also have the baliffs and the courts and a small civil division
that executies civil writs.

The police department has complete

police duties on the streets.

So our sheriff's deputies do not do

any patrol, do not work on the streets in the police capacity.
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI:

So they make the arrests and then they

hand the jurisdiction of that person over to you at the jail?
MR. LA PLANTE:

Right.

So we have all of the jails.

But

even in this case, as you know, we do get some controversial evictions that are difficult.

As a matter of fact, in the case of the

International Hotel, our six-man squads went in, five of whom were
unarmed.

Although in uniform with an empty holster, one of the 16

members had a gun, and our policy and procedure with regard to that
eviction, had we met any armed force, was that the deputies would
have retreated, and we negotiators would have gone in to attempt
to negotiate.

I think that many other agencies in California would

have handled that differently.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Does your experience enable you to reach

any conclusions as to whether or not the Kortum and Peterson interpretations of the use of deadly force statute should be applied
statewide?
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We have not formally studied this issue, and therefore
do not have a formal policy, but I would like to make just a few
observations.

One of them is that my background and experience

has been that of a pUblic prosecutor in Alameda County, and I've
heaxrl sane of the witnesses testify about police shootings in
Alameda County, in Oakland in particular, and I would just like
to make the observation that the testimony I've heard has been so
contrary to my own personal experience in Alameda County that I
find it to be somewhat incredulous.

With reference to police

shootings in that county, we had a number of cases that I can
recall.

One of them involving police officers that got drunk one

night and shot up a Black Panther headquarters.
Attorney did charge them.

The District

They were tried, they were convicted,

they did go to jail.
Another case involving a police officer who got drunk and
got into an automobile accident and hurt a person under circumstances
that we felt amounted to criminal negligence.

He was charged.

The

Geiten case that reference was made to, involved an Emeryville
police officer who was charged with killing a young man by the name
of Geiten, who apparently was escaping from a burglary.

There was

conflicting testimony in that case as to whether or not he was armed.
Every witness that could be found was brought to the grand jury and
testified in front of the grand jury.

The grand jury concluded that

there was not probable cause to believe that the officer had violated
the law.
We had another case in Berkeley, involving a police officer
-

who was allegedly abusing a prisoner.
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That case was charged, it was

tried, the jury acquitted him, but I think in terms of any reluctance on the part of the D.A., at least in that county to prosecute
police misconduct, that he should not be concerned

with it because

I don't think it exists.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Tom, can I ask you a question?

At the

hearing in Los Angeles on Monday, one of the suggestions that was
offered, and it was offered on behalf of the State PUblic Defender's
Office, was that a special prosecuting office be established in
order to prosecute improper use of deadly force by police.

The

argument that was made essentially was that the D.A.s have to work
so closely with the police on a day to day basis, that it is just
difficult for a D.A.'s office to be put in a position of having to
prosecute people that they're going to have to rely on to prepare
their own cases the next time around.

Do you think there's anything

to that argument?
MR. CONDIT:

Well, I think it will require the D.A.s to

make hard choices, but I think D.A.s have a pretty exemplary record
of making hard choices.

I don't know exactly what the position the

D.A.'s association would make on that issue.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

But in your experience I take it your

testimony is that you haven't seen a problem as far as D.A.s
prosecuting peace officers in Alameda County.
MR. CONDIT:

No, I haven't seen a reluctance to do so

when I felt the evidence warranted it, and when I was in Alameda
County we had a policy in any instance where a police officer had
shot someone, we sent out to one of our investigators and we sent
out an attorney to conduct an investigation at that time to
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determine whether there was any evidence which would suggest that
criminal charges ought to be brought, and if there were, they were
brought.
MR. ULLMAN:

Did I understand that you said that the

District Attorney was involved in investigating every police shooting or every police killing?
MR. CONDIT:

In Alameda County the D.A.'s office was

involved in investigating every police killing.
MR. ULLMAN:

And so it wasn't strictly handled by

Internal Affairs?
MR. CONDIT:

No.

MR. ULLMAN:

Let me ask you a question.

Roybal! testify.

You heard Mr.

Now I say you're responding to that.

His per-

ception of the grand jury proceedings in the Geigen case is obviously
different than what you've testified was presented before the grand
jury.
Do you feel that this should maybe be some other apparatus
to investigate these shootings

where the information is made pUblic?

I know the other balancing factor is dragging an officer's name
through the pUblic records, but obviously the secrecy of the proceedings has just led to suspicion by Mr. Roybal! that either the
right witnesses weren't presented to the grand jury.

Do you have

any comment on that?
MR. CONDIT:

Well, I think the grand jury being the

cross section of the community was an appropriate form to bring the
case in front of, and I had spent some time with Chuck Herbert who
was the prosecutor in that case, and I know from talking to him that

-so-

0

he made a conscientious effort to bring in front of the Grand Jury
every bit of evidence that his investigation could uncover.
MR. ULLMAN:

Of course, again the problem other people

perceive that the grand jury only knows what the District Attorney

0

brings before it, and obviously Mr. Roybal! has the impression that
not all evidence was brought before it which may or may not be fault.
MR. CONDIT:

Well, I'm not sure whether a public hearing

would have satisfied Mr. Roybal!.

0

MR. ULLMAN:

You may be right.

MR. CONDIT:

I have no further comments than what the

committee does.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

We will reconvene the subcommittee

hearings and ask Harold Snow if he would testify at this time.
MR. HAROLD SNOW:

0

Mr. Chairman, and committee members.

My name is Harold Snow, and I am senior consultant, Commission on
Peace Officers Standards and Training, and I'm here representing

0

our Executive Director, Bill Garlington, who was the person invited
to speak.

The

POST Commission has a very, very narrowly defined

role as you know in law, and our primary purpose for existence is to
set training and selection standards for California peace officers,
and seldom do we stray from that unless the Legislature has given
direction to do so.

a

The Commission has, in the past, had opportunity

to take positions on matters dealing with guns and use of deadly
force, but it has refrained from doing so primarily because it was
felt that that is something that should be left to other organizations and particularly the Legislature because it's a matter of public
polic-y.

I will -though- provide you with· some comments and some other
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In the apprehension of persons suspected of being involved in a crime where a firearm was used, 75% said "yes" and 9%
said "no".
In the defense of an officer, 96% said "yes".
In the defense of others, 95% said "yes".
As warning shots, 88% said "no" and only 6% said "yes " .
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. SNOW:

What was the question?

As warning shots.

Do you favor?

And the

overwhelming majority disfavors the use of warning shots.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. SNOW:

Disfavors?

Right.

Another question, should a firearms use policy include
specific instructions on the use of firearms, where it is known
that a juvenile is involved?

The answer there is 54% said "yes"

and 34% said "no".
Does your department have a system established to determine the facts in each incident involving the discharge of firearms
by and officer?

89% said "yes" and 10% said "no".

And the other questions relate to off-duty use of firearms.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Could we have a copy of the complete

results?
MR. SNOW:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

The entire thing, I'll provide that.
If the statute were to change and, say,

were to change in the Kortum-Peterson direction, would your training
change procedures?
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MR. SNOW:

Most definitely.

We would change now and be an

existing basic academy, but we undertake undoUbtedly a program to
retrain all existing 43,000, well, in this case, 80,000 peace officers, because you're talking about all peace officers in California.
Some 80,000 peace officers would have to be retrained in the sUbject.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Have you given any thought to how the

training would be changed, what retraining or what difference in
training would be necessary?
MR. SNOW:

We would not only have instruction on the

change of law, but we would develop situations and much of our instruction has gone to performance objective instruction, where we
get down to specific example, where we would ask them, based upon
the instruction on the law, you know give them situational kinds,
and then determine whether they would shoot or not shoot.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Do you have any reason to believe that

standards and training couldn't be developed which would enable law
enforcement to deal with a Kortum-Peterson standard as effectively
as law enforcement currently deals with an 1872 standard?
MR. SNOW:

I would say that the training would be longer,

there would be a more complex kind of instruction than now as currently
exists because the standards would be more restrictive.
it's not impossible.

I would say

We could develop training programs to meet

more restrictive standards.
MR. ULLMAN:

Mr. Snow, let me ask you a question.

In your

survey of 1974, it appears that 34% or so of the responding police
chiefs felt that use of deadly force should be utilized in felonious
death offenses, and currently, I think the thinking is about 85%
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adopting the CPOA standards.

What's caused the change?

Do you

have any idea?
MR. SNOW:

Well, I think we ' ve evolved in California from

previous times where we had different thinking, different community
standards, less pUblic acceptance of use of deadly force, and the
law enforcement is a reactive responsive kind of •••
MR. ULLMAN:

Let me ask you another question.

asking your personal opinion.

Do

I'm just

you think that the policy decision

as to whether or not the peace officers should be able to use deadly
force and non-dangerous offenses should be a policy decision made by
law enforcement, or should it be made by the Legislature?
MR. SNOW:
MR. ULLMAN:
MR. SNOW:

As a personal response?
Yes.
I see both sides of the issue, and being a

former policeman, it was difficult at times to make decisions in
a fraction of a second when a car is bearing down on you, ahd you
have to decide whether it's a juvenile or an adult.

I think there

are two sides of the story, and I don't really have a comment on it.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

I'd just like to explore one area with

you which I'm not, in other words, sure where I'm headed in specifics, but in general there are some questions that have been deve l oping in this area in my mind.

In Los Angeles we heard from at least

three representatives of different law enforcement agencies that the
issue with regard to the use of deadly force really isn't the standard
so much, if at a l l, as it is with the training, that how deadly force
gets used in the field depends largely, if not exclusively, upon the
officer's ability and training a-s opposed to whatever the words are
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on paper that constitutes a standard, whether we have a Kortnm
standard or whether we have what we currently have.
First of all, do you think that is generally right?
Or do you think that there is more to the standard in the midst of
standards and training?

What would you view as predominate and to

what extent, and are you able to make any general comments about?
MR. SNOW:

I think attitudes have a tremendous impact.

Attitudes which are shaped by not only the kind of people that we're
bringing into law enforcement these days, but by the training.

Our

training has evolved a lot which may impact upon the use of deadly
force, also, in that we have become far
kind of training we're providing.

more humanistic in the

We spent over $1 million on a

training program to update training concerning the role of a peace
officer and getting along with people and the community, and this
was known as Project Star which has become national in scope now,
and this has shaped our training program, and it shaped the selection of peace officers.

I really believe that there are three

things that shape whether deadly force is used, the attitude, and the
caliber of an officer, the law, and the department's policy.

All

three of those have equal impact in the use of deadly force.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Now, as I understood your prior testi-

mony, if the law were to change, the training would change, and the
training would become more sophisticated or complex, or detailed.
MR. SNOW:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

I wonder then if another reason to

consider a change in the law, and I don't know if this would be a
logical conclusion, I'd be curious as to whether you think it is,
is that through that type of a change we would then have another
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incentive for the training to get stiffer or tougher, which the
training might not otherwise do if the law stays the same.
MR. SNOW:

we•re currently in the process of increasing our

training requirement.

We have historically had, since 1964, a 200

hour training requirement.

Now, in January, the Commission will con-

sider a proposal and we have reason to believe that they will doUble
that to 400 hours.

That is the minimum. In reality, the average

training time now in law enforcement is about 550 hours, and that•s
something like 14 or 15 weeks of instruction which is -- we view as
improvement.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

Thank you very much for taking the

time to testify.
MR. SNOW:

I 1 ll send that to you too.

ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

Good, thanks a lot.

Our final wit-

ness will be Amitai Schwartz who -- are you speaking for the ACLU
or are you speaking as a private citizen?
MR. AMITAI SCHWARTZ:

No, I 1 m speaking on behalf of the

American Civil Liberties Union, as well as a number of other groups.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Good.

Proceed.

Thank you very much.

First of all, let me

apologize for holding up the Committee.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

It is not at all your falut, you were

scheduled on our formal agenda for 3:00 pm so you are an hour early.
MR. SCHWARTZ:

I would have liked to have come earlier but

I was attending a banquet where I was one of the honorees and it
would have been impolite to walk out.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Congratulations.
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MR. SCHWARTZ:

0

I'm the Legal Director of the Northern

California Police Practices Project, which is a joint project of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Mexican-American Legal Defense
Fund and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.

0

I've been the Director of

that Project for over four years and our principal concern is with
police abuses of power and furthering police accountability in the
manner in which they deal with citizens.
litigate when that becomes necessary.

We do that in two ways, we

For example, our group brought

and prosecuted the case of Kortum vs. Alkire, which I presume precipitated these hearings.
We prosecuted that on behalf of a number of mock taxpayers
because we saw the deadly force problem as one that was resolvable
by the courts.
Secondly, we try to negotiate and work with police departments as best we can, and in many circumstances we've been able to
do that.

We worked at great length with the Vallejo Police Depart-

ment when Bill Garlington was its Chief of Police.

We worked with

the San Francisco Police Department and we've worked with others in
a non-adversary capacity trying to assist the departments in developing regulations governing contacts with citizens.
One of the principal issues that has come into our office
over the four years that we have been in existence is police use of
deadly force generally.

It is situations of police use of deadly

force and probably the most

the most serious and critical police

issues facing minority communities in particular, and all other
communities in California.

There is, at least in my personal exper-

ience as Director of this project, there is nothing like a policeman
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shooting, whether the officer be right or wrong in the particular
circumstance, that quite triggers the feeling and the hurt for both
the officer and the community.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

Excuse me for one moment.

Mr. Jensen

would like to interrupt.
MR. JENSEN:

I wonder if you'd elaborate on that.

We've

taken testimony before that said this is a very infrequent problem;
that considering the number of arrests, the use of deadly force is
miniscule compared to the number of assaults on peace officers; but
yet, you're saying it is a prevalent problem.

Is it symbolically

a problem, or a real one?
MR. SCHWARTZ:
actuality.

It's in part symbolic and it's in part in

I'm suggesting that the symbolism that revolves around

any of these events when it happens, such as in Oakland, there have
been a number of recent incidents of police killing suspects and
I'm not prejudging whether those were justified or not, I'm just
saying that they happened.

Symbolically, that represents to many

minority communities, particularly Black and Latino communities,
the tip of the iceberg in terms of many of the other problems with
the police.

But as a factual matter, the Bureau of Criminal Statis-

tics did a study in 1973 for this committee, I believe, where they
went through every single death that had occurred as a result of
police use of deadly force in California over the past two years,
I don't remember the exact number but think it was somewhere between
90 and 100 per year.

That's 90 and 100 people killed and in some of

those cases it was likely justified and in some of the cases it
wasn't, either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, but it's
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not something that's susceptible to quantification, because when you

0

lose a life, when you extinguish a life in a situation when it's not
justified, it's something that the Legislature and the courts and
each and every one of us have to consider very, very seriously.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:
MR. JENSEN:
by not justified?
issue.

Mr. Jensen.

Could I ask you a question?

What do you mean

Could that--I think that's sort of begging the

Are you talking about the killings where it was just obviously

a willful act that is not justified under the current law, or not
justified under what should be current policy?
MR. SCHWARTZ:
question:

You're absolutely correct, I am begging the

I was hoping to get to it and you gave me the opportunity.

Well, there are two senses in which I use the word not justified.
One is not justified as a matter of fact.

There have been a number

of incidents in the Bay Area within the last couple of years that have
come to our attention where the police officers in stopping a suspect,
or attempting to apprehend a suspect, handled the firearms in a reckless manner.

The principal incident that comes to mind was the situ-

ation in San Jose with the San Jose Sheriff's Department some three
years ago where a Black man was stopped on a warrant check and after
being pulled out of the car and spread-eagled against the car, one
of the officers put a gun to his head while he was frisking him with
the other hand and meantime there were other police officers standing
around with guns drawn.

What happened was the gun went off, and we

looked into the facts very carefully and it wasn't our belief that
it was an intentional shooting.

It was, in fact, an accidental

shooting.
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But on the other hand, it would not have happened had the
gun been handled in a more appropriate manner and had the gun been
reholstered and the other officers covered the suspect during the
time that he was being frisked.

So I'm suggesting that that sort

of a killing, whether or not it's justified by the Penal Code as
an unintentional act, is unjustified as a matter of fact or as a
matter of policy.
The second area deals with the legal justifications for
use of deadly force, and as this committee most likely knows, that
area is presently in flux.

The Penal Code, on its face, and the

Penal Code, Section 1963 was enacted in 1872, a hundred and five
years ago, so that the police can use deadly force in attempting
to apprehend any felon who is fleeing from arrest.
The First District Court of Appeal interpreted that term
11

any felon .. in the case of Kortum vs. Alcari to mean any violent

felon, to bring it into standards of contemporary times rather than
the time of 1872.

That issue is presently before the California

Supreme Court and is likely to be resolved early next year in a
case called Peterson vs. City of Long Beach.
'

'

It's our position,

the organizations that I represent, certainly the taxpayers that
we represented in the .Kortum case, that Penal Code Section 1963
can no longer be read literally, that the Kortum court was absolutely
correct in its interpretation of the Penal Code as a matter of law
and that the Constitution of both the State of California and the
United States compelled the result that was reached in the Kortum
case.
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So, when I talk about justifiable homicide, I mean one-the position we take is a homicide is justified because the lethal
force was used in circumstances where there was a danger to the
officer, a danger to life, or serious bodily harm; or there was a
danger to others, a danger to life or serious bodily harm.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

Let me just ask a question please.

Did you argue in Kortum that when the Legislature drafted the 1872
statute that the legislative intent was that felony didn't really
mean felony but it meant violent felony?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

No we didn't.

We did not argue from the

standpoint of what legislative intent was in 1872.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

What was your theory that got you

to the definition of--the restricted definition of felony?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well what we suggested was that in 1872

there were, under the common law, there were only a number of
offenses categorized as felonies.

All except, I think, mayhem

were punishable by death.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

May I just ask you, were those offen-

ses violent crimes or were some of them non-violent crimes?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

No, they weren't.

Every one of them was

violent, with the exception of treason, I believe.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

So felony in 1872 meant basically a

narrower list of what was, other than treason, violent criminal
acts.
MR. SCHWARTZ:

That's correct.

The origin is of the

common law growing out of England; but I can't tell you precisely.
Obviously, there were other felonies in 1872, because much of the
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present Penal Code defining offenses was also passed in 1872; but
I'm saying that back in those times, they were rough

and ready

times, and to be a suspected felon was as good as being a dead one
in many cases.
The 1872 rule made some sense, but we argued what was good
in 1872 has totally outlived its usefulness for contemporary times,
and the reason for that is--there are a great many reasons, but one
is that the Legislature establishes new crimes all the time, or
raises certain offenses from misdemeanor to a fel6ny, sometimes
based on the violent character of the crime, sometimes not.

But

I think it's fair to say that the Legislature, when it categorizes
an offense as a felony does not consider that in terms of whether
the police officer is going to shoot somebody and kill them in the
course of apprehending them.

Likewise, the justifications for the

1872 rule just evaporate upon inspection.

Th~

reasons why killing

a person makes sense, if they have not committed a violent crime
and if they present no immediate threat to anyone •••
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

What about the argument that we've

heard both today and Monday that you have a burglar who has not,
at least to the knowledge of the police officer who is trying to
apprehend him at the time, used violence, but although the officer
didn't realize it, this burglar also committed a homicide and did
some other terrible things that did involve violence and if you
don't have the leeway of getting him with the 1872 statute, you
may lose somebody who you don't know at the time really is somebody
who has committed violent criminal behavior, and you've got to have
the opportunity to apprehend them-with deadly force.
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MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, let me answer it in two ways.

First

of all, I think it's completely unjustified to allow a police officer
to make a split second decision as to whether to take someone's life
on the basis of speculative facts in that there is a possibility
that this suspect may have done something worse than what we're
apprehending him for.

I think the Los Angeles Police Commission

regulations, which were recently passed, provide specifically that
you can't justify a death by something that came after--something
you found out afterward.

You have to take the facts as you find

them.
Secondly, I think that in this time with increased police
communications equipment, with mutual aid compacts between cities,
it's unrealistic to assume that every person who is suspected of
committing a felony and then escapes will permanently evade apprehension.

I think you're assuming too much and in a sense I think

our police are better than that.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

I think they can do the job.

What if the police don't know whether

the person they're going after does or does not have a gun and did
or did not commit a crime with violence but, you know, may have but
they just don't know?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, the answer to the question really

depends on the circumstances.

I'm not advocating that any police

officer ought to take any unreasonable risk.

If the circumstances

apparent to a reasonable police officer lead him to fear for his
life or that there might be harm, then I think it's appropriate to
have the gun ready.
impossible to say.

But without examining the circumstances, it's
Obviously, if you get stopped for a traffic
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offense on the way out of this auditorium, I think you would probably
be offended and scared if the officer put a gun through the window
in the course of telling you to get out.
On the other hand, if he had some objective information
which led him to believe that you were a danger, it might make more
sense.
Let me just take one more minute to answer the question
about burglary.

Chief Gain, when he was Chief in Oakland, changed

his department's policy back in 1968 with regard to fleeing burglars,
in particular, in not using firearms to apprehend the fleeing burglar
unless there was an indication of violence or a risk to the officer
!

or others, and this is the way he justified this policy.
11

He said:

Considering that only 7.65% of all adult burglars arrested, and

only .28% of all juvenile burglarsarrested are eventually incarcerated, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the use of
deadly force by peace officers to apprehend burglars cannot conceivably be justified.

For adults, the police would have to shoot

100 burglars in order to have captured the eight who would have gone
to prison.

For juveniles, the police would have had to shoot 1,000

burglam in order to have captured the three who would have gone to
the Youth Authority...

That was one of the justifications given back

in 1968 in connection with the problem of burglary.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Did you have a question?

Obviously at the bottom of all of this is

the question of whether human life is so dear to us, as it is, that
we can justify taking the life of a suspected person on the more
probably cause belief that the person h~s committed a felony
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in

the course of attempting to apprehend that person.

Traditionally,

and under the common law, it was the rule that deadly force is never
justified in attempting to apprehend a fleeing misdemeanant, and that
was the law in

1872~

but the dichotomy now between felonies and mis-

demeanors is so fuzzy, in many cases, and there are so many nonviolent
sorts of

crime~

are felonies.

for example, voter fraud, certain forms of voter fraud
And you may recall that about two years ago there was

quite a hullabaloo in San Francisco about various police officers,
firemen, and other city officials voting in the city elections even
though

they lived outside the city, and some of those people were

charged with--initially, with certain forms of felony voter fraud.
Well, under the rule, as some officers interpret it and as the
Legislature wrote it in 1872, if some of those voter fraud suspects
had attempted to flee, and the police attempted to apprehend them
and felt that it was necessary to shoot, it would have been justified.

I don't think that rule makes any sense and !·don't think

it's the kind of rule that the police need in order to do their job
effectively.
Secondly, the section of the Penal Code, Section 17

~)

which defines what a felony is and generally says it's any offense
which is punishable for more than a year, or punishable in the state
prison, also says that there are certain sorts of offenses which
are commonly called wobblers which you don't determine whether they
are felonies or misdemeanors until after the district attorney has
filed an information and the judge has given consideration to the
various circumstances and then the court decides in the deliberation
of a courtroom with full due process for both sides whether it's a
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misdemeanor or a felony.

And if you contrast that to the situation

on the streets where you have a police officer with a deadly weapon
making the determination on the spot with regard to what is a felony
and what is a misdemeanor and whether force is justified •.•
MR. ULLMAN:

Mr. Schwartz, do you have any idea what the

percentage of arrests that are booked as felonies result in convictions as felonies?
MR. SCHWARTZ:
MR. ULLMAN:
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Do you have an idea what •••
I don't know

offhand.

I think it's astoundingly small.
It is because, and I think the Bureau of

Criminal Statistics could give us an answer relatively quick, but
you know, with the number of dismissals for lack of evidence, or
whatever, and the number of dismissals for police practices that
violate the Fourth Amendment or certain state statutes, and then
when you get into the plea bargaining situation, and then you get
into the judge's discretion as to what kind of sentence he's going
to give, I think the number of felonies, and especially when you
start looking at the area of nonviolent felonies, that actually result in convictions and incarceration, I think it would be quite
revealing, but I don't have the statistics on the top of my head.
The final conclusion to this portion is that we all have
to recognize this goes into the plea bargaining situation and the
way the courts work generally is that it's impossible for any police
department to prosecute all persons that they have probable cause
to believe have committed felonies.

It happens all the time that

the police, as they should do, make selective decisions as to what
- .
.
their priorities are. What are their priorities in a particular
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community?

The priorities in Los Angeles County might be a little

different than the priorities in the City of Pleasant Hills, a
suburb of San Francisco.

And the police are given the discretion

to make those selective decisions as to priorities.

And we support

that: but at the same time, one has to recognize that there are
certain sorts of offenses which are either defined as misdemeanors
or felonies that go unprosecuted.

To allow the police to make the

snap judgment that it's worth taking a human life in the situation
of a nonviolent felony in order to prevent the person from escaping,
I think is, again, giving the police much too much power to exercise in those situations.

Now, you know, I've put great stress on

the fleeing felon rule and that's what I intend to underscore because what I'm not suggesting is that there isn't a role for firearms
in self-defense and where serious bodily harm is threatened.

That

obviously makes sense and it's obviously justified.
The second area that I want to suggest is on the whole
area of drawing firearms and intimidating behavior with firearms.
It's something that I suspect is not easily resolvable by the
Legislature, but I want to bring it to your attention.

The question

was asked of me earlier, how many of these instances actually occur?
Well, if you count the number of people who actually die, you know,
it's maybe 100, 110, 125 in a year, but then you also have to ask,
how many people are threatened or how many officers draw guns in
situations where an accident could have occurred in that same sort
of situation that I suggested happened in San

Jose~

And you know,

I remember a conversation I had with Bill Garlington about three
years ago about the Vallejo Police Department, and he said, we tell
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our officers to keep the gun in the holster unless you're going to
use it, and if you have cause to believe you might have to use it
but you're not sure, then you take the gun out of the holster and
you point it toward the ground and you have your finger on the
trigger, but you don't point it at the guy's head unless it becomes
apparent that the circumstances justify the firing of that gun: and
I think the Los Angeles Police Commission attempted to deal with
this problem specifically.

Time and time again, we're contacted

by persons who run into situations where the police, certain police
officers, and they're definitely a minority, use the weapon as a
means of intimidation and as a means of authority.

We've had situ-

ations where police come to the door of a home and the resident says,
do you have a warrant?
warrant.

And he pulls out a gun and says, this is my

Things like that can't be tolerated, and on local levels

there really is a responsibility of the chief of police and the
sheriff to control that sort of thing, but I think that especially
with regard to Penal Code Section 417, dealing with brandishing
firearms, it's not clear whether that applies to peace officers or
just private citizens.
But there is some area to look into, the local intentional
intimidation by use of a gun and it's something that I suggest happens
more frequently than one would suspect by the number of deaths.
Finally, there's the area of investigation in shooting
cases.

One of the major problems that I've noted, for minority

communities in particular, is that they just don't have the information and they're just not leveled with by law enforcement officials,
by - some law

en~orcement

officia1s,
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~1th

regard to whether a - particular

shooting was justified or not justified, and when you lose someone
you love or a noted community person, the immediate response is that
the person was killed by the police and there was not good reason
for it.

And the police feed that paranoia by refusing to make pUblic

any of the information that they gather in their investigations and
refusing to come forward and be honest about it.
I have seen situations where the police were quite up front
about precisely what happened, giving reports, district attorneys
giving reports as to the progress they were taking in the cases,
and I think it went a long way to alleviate a good deal of the suspicion and a good deal of the problems that are often generated by
these shootings.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE:

What about the argument that you don't

want to cause the offending officer, in the course of an investigation,
to be prejudged, or that you don't want to drag his name out in pUblic
while the investigation is still proceeding, if there is an investigation?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, I understand that concern and I think

it's a serious one and it's a balance that has to be struck and has
to be struck carefully.

I think, particularly with the rights of the

police officer as a criminal suspect, I think those have to be involate.
And secondly, because I think anytime that a police officer
pulls a trigger and kills someone, it's going to bring tremendous
sorrow and remorse.
But I think there is a way to give out information without
necessarily dragging the police officer into something which is both
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unfair and unjust.

The police officer is acting on behalf of the

department; he's wearing the uniform and using the firearm which is
issued by the department, and I think the department can take a
position, and certainly a tentative position, with regard to the
circumstances, and let the criminal process take its course.

If

the officer is not prosecuted criminally, as most are not, the
district attorney ought to explain why that decision was made,
rather than just saying that the officer will not be prosecuted
and that's the end of it and we didn't do anything wrong and everybody go home until it happens again.
I saw this happen in Alameda County . where there was a
killing of the Union

City resident by a Union City police officer,

and initially the community, the Chicano community in Union City,
was terribly upset and for good reason, because they believed that
there was no justification in shooting this particular person.

He

was riding a bicycle after stealing a ham out of a supermarket and
was shot by a police officer in the course of fleeing with the ham.
The district attorney investigated that incident, and as far as I
could tell, did a fairly thorough job of it, and refused to prosecute
the officer; but at the same time he refused to prosecute the officer,
he also issued a statement saying

we investigated the case, we talked

to any number of witnesses, we flew witnesses up here from Los Angeles,
we tracked down various witnesses who were here.

He didn't use any

witnesses'names, and said it was apparent that the suspect had a
knife, and illustrated why that belief was true.

Obviously a state-

ment like that is not going to satisfy everybody, but I think it did
satisfy some personsbecause it -went into some detail, without
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0

revealing names and without giving away the case, of what the facts
were.

0

And I think the District Attorney and the Grand Jury of Alameda

County at that time really did a commendable exercise in coming forward, but most police don't do that.
MR. ULLMAN:

0

Can I ask you for the record, was that the

Geidon (?) case?
MR. SCHWARTZ:
MR. ULLMAN:

The what?
The Guedon (?) case.

MR. SCHWARTZ:
MR. ULLMAN:

Guidon?
Guidon case.

MR. SCHWARTZ:

No, that was

not~

It was the case of

Alberto Teheronez. (?)
MR. ULLMAN:

Could I ask you a couple of other questions?

Do you feel, number one, that the internal affairs division of a
police department should be the ones investigating police shootings,
or police killings and if not, is the district attorney an adequate
investigator, given the ties with the police department in their
day to day prosecutions?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

I think, for the most part, internal affairs

bureaus of the police departments are definitely not the place to
make a conclusive investigation of the circumstances surrounding a
death at the hands of a police officer.

District attorneys, I think

district attorneys can be used profitably provided that the deputies
who actually do the investigation don't rely exclusively on the findings of the police department but, in fact, do an independent investigation: and secondly, that the deputy who does the investigation
is sufficiently removed from the day to day workings of the police
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department that he can reach an objective judgment.
San Francisco has worked out an informal procedure between
the police department and the district attorney's office here with
regard to how District Attorney Freitas is going to investigate
po1ice shooting cases.

I've been trying a year to get them to do

it in writing and they keep promising me that it's coming but, in
fact, they've been doing it informally and it's a standing policy,
they assure me, if a shooting occurs in San Francisco at the hands
of a police officer, the district attorney's office is called immediately.

The chief assistant district attorney assigns an investi-

gator; the investigator goes to the scene as soon as he or she can
and begins an independent investigation.

The instructions are not

to get in the way of the police and not to go making accusations
against the officer, but to get to the scene as soon as possible and
then to do an independent follow-up investigation with regard to the
circumstances.
MR. ULLMAN:

Is this fairly common in Bay Area counties,

or is it just San Francisco?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

I don't know that it is common because

the situation where we've had, and I don't want to mislead the
committee by saying that I have recent information but at least,
as of about two years ago Santa Clara County, the district attorney's
office down there was merely reviewing the investigations done by the
police and making a judgment on that basis and then presenting the
case to the grand jury.
MR. ULLMAN:

Do you think there should be some state
legislation mandating district attorney's offices to investigate all
police shootings or police killings?
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MR. SCHWARTZ:

You know, I think it would be very useful

and probably the spur that•s necessary to make sure that it works,
because you•ve got a number of values at stake.

One, you•ve got

the value of preventing an unjustified killing from happening again.
Secondly, you•ve got the whole value of the criminal law, that people
who commit crimes ought not to be treated differently because of
their class or character and that police officers commit crimes, as
most

don•t~

but when they do that the situation ought to be inves-

tigated and looked into the same way it is if you or I commit a
crime.
And third is the whole question of the kind of information
that•s going to be given to the community and whether the people who
are served by the municipal service known as policing, whether they
will accept the findings of the police department or the district
attorney•s office which merely says that the killing was justified
and that•s the end of it.

There has to be openness.

This Legislature

has recognized time and time again, in the Brown Act and in the PUblic
Records Act and in various other kinds of sunshine laws, that openness
really leads to honesty and leads to confidence on the part of citizens:
and I think the Legislature can go a long way in this particular area,
precisely because in some sense it•s a symbol, and in some sense because we are talking about human lives.
I 1 ll conclude unless the Committee has further questions.
MR. ULLMAN:

Yes, Mr. Jensen has a question and I do, right

at this point.
MR. JENSEN:

You want to go ahead?

MR. ULLMAN:

No, go ahead.
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MR. JENSEN:

I have a couple of questions.

I wonder if

you would elaborate a little bit about the basis of your constitutional challenge to the broad ruling of justifiable homicide.
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, it's difficult to do briefly.

I'd

be happy to make a copy of the brief we filed in the Peterson case •••
MR. JENSEN:

Maybe that would be simplest.

MR. SCHWARTZ:

••• available to you, but generally, the

Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable force in the apprehension
of a suspect and the rule which authorizes police to use lethal
force is unreasonable for a variety of reasons which I've alluded
to some and I haven't others.
And the other right atstake is the right not to be deprived
of life without a trial.

Not even a judge can summarily take action

in his courtroom in terms of contempt unless the contempt directly
interferes and is immediately necessary to preserve the function
of the court, so to give the police officer the right to take a life
on the mere probable cause belief that the person has comitted any
felony violates due process.
MR. JENSEN:

I have a second question and we haven't dis-

cussed this, or at least you haven't discussed this.

It's been

suggested at least once that the concern of law enforcement was
with the criminal liability that might flow from the restricted
reading of when they make a reasonable mistake.

For instance, the

criminal liability that might flow from a narrow statute would pose
an extreme problem with them and dissuade them from vigorously pursuing their duty; whereas they were not concerned necessarily with
-

.

the civil liability that might flow from a
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reasonable- mistake~ -

D

Have you given any thought to the idea of bifurcating this?

In

other words, saying that we will expand or narrow the term "reasonable
force" when we're talking about civil liability but not when we're
talking about criminal liability.
Well, let me just elaborate on that for one second.
the area that I wanted to get into.

It's

Short of the issue of bifurca-

tion, how do you feel about the concern that if somebody is faced
with a split second decision, as a law enforcement officer is in
these situations, and they end up making the wrong decision, they
do have criminal liability, should they or shouldn't they?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, the question of liability, I guess,

the way you're using the term, is the person possibly sUbject to
criminal sanctions •••
MR. JENSEN:
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Right.
••• because I think in the examples you're

giving me, if it's an accident or if there is a group faith and
belief, then it's no longer an intentional violation and therefore
would not necessarily lead to criminal liability.
MR. JENSEN:

Well still, you get questions of theft which

gets read differently by different people and the officer insists
that he had a good faith belief and the jury concludes that it
wasn't reasonably held, and then he's prosecuted and convicted.
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, that's why we have the jury system,

and we're all sUbject to those sort of concerns when we, in our
daily lives -- I'm not convinced, at least, that the police hold a
special case, especially when it's in regard to this nonviolent
killing situation.

With this nonviolent killing situation, I mean
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if an officer can point to circumstances that lead him or her to
be1ieve that the subject is armed or that it was a dangerous felony,
then you don't have a problem.

I think it depends more, for me at

1east, and I understand that many representatives of law enforcement
are saying, it probably depends on how the statute is worded, and
I think if you make the statute precise enough and the Legislature
is careful about, as it should be whenever it defines an offense or
a justification for an offense, that you're going to get rid of most
of these problems, but if you just use the term violent felony, you
know, then you've got some other problems, but you see, right now
I think that the police department themselves can begin to rectify
some of those problems by giving careful considerate instructions,
both in terms of training and guidelines.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Have you tried your hand at drafting a

statute in this area?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

No, I have not.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Would you be interested in doing so?

I may be.

I'd like to see what the Supreme

Court does in the Peterson case, and then, depending on the result •••
CSAIRMAN LEVINE:

If you do have a specific thought as to

a statute that you would suggest, I'd be interested in it sometime
in the next several months.
MR. SCHWARTZ:

I'd be happy to do that and, in fact, just

recently we had a law student at our office go through the codes of
all fifty states and collect the existing statutes on justifiable
homicide, and I'll be happy to make those available to the Committee.
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MR. JENSEN:
range:

I'd be particularly interested in sort of the

What the toughest are, the most lenient, and where we fit,

basically.
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, where we presently fit is in the dark

ages in that we follow the old common law of rule, but that is not
to say that we're alone; but it is to say that many states are beginning to change over from that legislation.
MR. ULLMAN:

Could I explore that with you?

You say we are

in the dark ages as far as the statute is concerned, but aren't we
sort of in a progressive age as far as the police department regulations are concerned generally?

Don't most, if not nearly all

police departments, have pretty restrictive gun use policies that
are on paper?
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Well, many of them do.

And as far as I've

been able to tell recently, the major California departments do.

I

don't know about the Highway Patrol, but the major departments do.
But part of the problem is enforcement of those local regulations.
In the Peterson case, the City of Long Beach had a regulations saying,
thou shalt not shoot in this situation, and the shooting occurred
anyway.

So I think what's indicated by the fact that many of the

major police departments already have their own administrative rules
saying this is that -- the police can live without, because they've
said it.

They've said it to their own people, and they've said that

we've administratively made a policy saying that we don't want you
shooting in these situations.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

Mr. Schwartz, thank you very much for

your testimony and your help and I would be interested in staying
in touch with regard to possible developments in the law.
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MR. SCHWARTZ:

Thank you very much, and I'll make that

summary of the other states' statutes available to the Committee,
hopefully right after the new year.
CHAIRMAN LEVINE:
MR. SCHWARTZ:

Thank you.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN LEVINE:

With this testimony, we will conclude

our hearings on the use of deadly force by law enforcement by the
joint sUbcommittees for the interim session.

########
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Thank you.

